INTRODUCTION
For the longest time, philosophers and psychologists have been claiming that people who observe other people's actions are prone to simulate those actions in a more or less rudimentary form -at least in their minds, but sometimes even with their bodies (e.g., Carpenter, 1874 Carpenter, /1984 Chevreul, 1833; Goldman, 2002; James, 1890; Liberman et al., 1967; Smith, 1759 Smith, /1976 Ueberwasser, 1787) . In order to avoid confusions with broader uses of the concept of simulation in cognitive theorizing (e.g., Grush, 2003; Hesslow, 2002; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998) I will here use the term of re-enactment to address the specific notion that the perception of certain actions and their outcomes (performed by others) may induce the production of related actions (performed by the perceiver herself).
Whereas much of the classical literature is based on anecdotal evidence the notion of re-enactment has recently gained more systematic support from behavioural and neurophysiological studies. For instance, behavioural studies of action induction have provided insight into basic functional principles underlying overt re-enactment (Knuf et al., 2001; De Maeght and Prinz, 2004; Prinz et al., 2005; Prinz, 1987) . Likewise, neurophysiological studies have identified populations of neurons at various brain sites that exhibit mirror-like properties. These neurons are involved in both, perceiving certain actions in others and performing those actions oneself (for overviews, see Gallese et al., 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti, 2004) .
WHAT FOR?
The question I wish to address here is what reenactment is good for. If observing certain actions indeed goes along with (covertly or overtly) reenacting them -what does such re-enacting earn the observer? I will briefly discuss the merits of three answers that have been proposed: imitation, identification, and anticipation.
Imitation
At first glance it may appear to be plausible that mirror systems should be built into animals' brains and minds for the sake of imitation: If parts of the neural structures in charge of the perception of others' actions coincide with structures in charge of the production of those actions, then imitation of other individuals' actions may come for free just as a by-product of perceiving them. This idea was initially promoted by some researchers after the first discoveries on mirror neurons had been made. Yet, attractive as it appeared at first glance, it was soon abandoned for two major reasons. First, as Rizzolatti et al. (2001) had pointed out from the beginning, monkeys don't ape. Though they do dispose of a rich mirror system in their premotor cortex, they do not imitate -suggesting that the mirror system must be good for something else. Second, mirror activity and re-enactment appear to be mandatory consequences of action perception, whereas imitation -whenever it occurs in humans (and other primates) -is extremely context-bound. True, humans and primates are capable of imitating certain actions they observe -but they certainly don't do it all day long as one would have to expect if imitation were to follow from mirrorneuron activity. In fact, if they did so, they would have to count as endangered species. Their fitness will be much more dependent on their ability to respond to foreign action through own complementary action than through own imitation.
In sum, it is not likely that the architecture for 
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